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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence about the effects of economic incentives
embedded in the Italian Social Security system on retirement decisions. The
1992 reform is an interesting example since it was implemented when: (a) the
system was very generous to retirees; (b) the demographic context was dramatic;
(c) an early retirement provision, and no actuarial fairness, distorted retirement
choices. I use the reform as a natural experiment and exploit its differential
effect on individuals belonging to different groups, namely blue- and white-collar
workers. I find evidence that Social Security wealth has a larger impact on
retirement choices compared to estimates in previous studies.
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1 Introduction
Italy is facing a demographic transition which will cause an increase of the depen-
dency ratio from 27% in 2000 to over 54% in 2050. This dramatic population ageing
- coming both from fertility rates reduction and life expectancy increase - might make
the Social Security system unsustainable in the long run, especially if low activity and
employment rates are also taken into account (see figure ??). This paper is intended
to provide new evidence about the effect of financial incentives on retirement decisions
using an econometric technique which differs from the ones adopted in previous studies
regarding the Italian Social Security system. By exploiting variation in explanatory
variables generated by changes in a state law, I get a source of exogenous variation.
These studies, called natural experiments, examine outcome measures for observations
in treatment and comparison groups (white- and blue-collar workers in this case) that
are not randomly assigned. Krueger and Pischke (1992) point out that most of the
contribution to the literature suffers from an identification problem: the variation in
economic incentives needed to estimate their effect on retirement behaviour cannot be
considered independent of other unobserved individual characteristics that also cor-
relate with retirement behaviour. For example, if I want to estimate the effects of
Social Security programs on labour supply, it is often times difficult to distinguish the
effect of individual benefit entitlement from that of past labour supply and earnings
that typically determine that benefit entitlement. This problem is exacerbated when I
use proxies for the relevant benefit variables so that idiosyncratic and potentially en-
dogenous variation in the benefit variables is lost. Thus, structural parameters cannot
be identified robustly on the basis of observed behaviour, and estimated reduced-form
effects of incentive variables cannot be interpreted as causal effects. Some attempts
can be found in the relevant literature: Krueger and Pischke (1992) exploit a natu-
ral experiment in the USA provided by the 1977 amendments to the Social Security
Act which created an unexpected reduction in Social Security wealth for the ”notch
generation”. Gruber (1996) uses exogenous variation in disability benefits generosity
across similar workers provided by the 1987 reform in Quebec. Baker and Benjamin
(1999) identify the casual effect of sequential early retirement provisions in Canada
by comparing regions with different timing of introduction. Coile and Gruber (2000a,
2000b) build incentive variables that minimize the spurious correlation problem by
capturing incentives to work in all future years, and apply a rich set of controls from
previous income and work experience. Red and Haugen (2003) use a new subsidized
early retirement option assigned quasi-randomly to two-thirds of Norwegian elderly
workers as a natural experiment. They find the new option reduced employment sub-
stantially and the effect escalated over time. As to the Italian literature, Brugiavini
and Peracchi (2003, 2004) evaluate the impact of SSW on the probability of retirement
and find a positive relationship: individuals with higher SSW are more likely to retire.
To my knowledge, Brugiavini (1997) is the only study - applied to the Italian Social
Security system - which exploits exogenous variation induced by a reform to identify
the effect of pension wealth on retirement decisions. The methodology adopted is a
difference-in-difference estimator. This paper differs from the analysis by Brugiavini
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in different ways. First of all, the data set was drawn from the panel component of
the Bank of Italy survey, with the consequent bias due to reported income and pension
benefits, whereas my data is extracted from the administrative archive of the Italian
Social Security Institute (I.N.P.S.), and it is high-quality data. Secondly, Brugiavini
(1997) estimates changes in expected retirement ages taken from the answers to the
survey, while my dependent variable is a dummy for actual retirement status. Finally,
her analysis is an application of the difference-in-difference estimator since the model is
linear and she can compute the expected value of the dependent variable given different
values of the relevant dummies, whereas I use a non-linear model and a dichotomous
dependent variable. This is the first study applied to the Italian Social Security system
that identifies the causal effect of Social Security wealth on retirement behaviour by
exploiting a pension reform as a natural experiment. The work is structured as fol-
lows: section 2 clarifies the details of the 1992 reform, section 3 explains the concept of
Social Security wealth and derives standard incentive measures; section 4 contains the
estimates of age-earnings profiles necessary to build Social Security benefits; section 5
and 6 describe the empirical specification and the main econometric issues; section 7
and 8 present some preliminary evidence of the effect of the pension reform on indi-
vidual retirement behaviour and the main results of the paper respectively; section 9
illustrates some policy simulations and section 10 concludes.
2 Institutional details of the Amato reform
In 1991 Italy had one of the most generous Social Security systems in the world
which was already known to be unsustainable in the long run. Issues concerning the
reform of the pension system were debated in those years, and a change in the legislation
was widely expected. It is important to underline that the type of reform that would
have been implemented was not obvious, as well as who and to what extent would have
been affected the most by the reform. The exact change in Social Security wealth might
not have been fully anticipated, and this can help identify the relation between pension
wealth and retirement decision purged from endogenous factors. The Italian Social
Security system is made up of three major funds: one for private sector employees, one
for public-sector employees and one for self-employed. Since the sample is extracted
from the private sector employees fund, the following description focuses on the changes
introduced by the reform for such workers. The main changes concern the criteria of
eligibility for old age and early retirement provisions and the size of the benefits paid.
The reform envisioned an increase in the normal retirement age in the private sector
from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for women, an increase in the minimum number
of years of payroll tax to claim a pension benefit from 15 to 20, and a reduction in
benefits obtained through the substitution of a final salary type with a career average
earnings method of computation. One of the main drawbacks of the Amato reform is
the very long transitional period supposed to be completed only by 2032. Then, the
differential treatment for workers having accrued a different number of contributive
years in 1992, thus belonging to different birth cohorts, introduced a further element
of distinction. It left almost untouched Social Security rights of workers who retired
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before 1993, but not the rights of those who - even if close to retirement - actually
retired after the reform was legislated by the Parliament, whereas it heavily affected
young workers. What really matters for the analysis is the differential effect concerning
the type of occupation: blue-collar and white-collar workers. In order to disentangle
the effect of the reform from the effect of occupational change, I exclude workers who
changed occupation over time. Furthermore, because individuals affected at that time
by the reform are only those at risk, that is individuals between 50 and 65 years of
age, this excludes the possibility of exploiting the differential effect between young and
old employees. A comparison between the benefit computation formula before and
after the 1992 reform (see table ??) clearly illustrates that the change from a final
salary type to a whole working life computation affected much more white collars who
typically have a steeper earning profile later in their career than blue collars.
Bt(r) =
∑4
s=0 YR−s
5
γRmin(cyrsR, 40) (1)
Indeed, the formula above implied an average of the last five years real earnings
(converted to real values through a price index), whereas formula (??) contains an aver-
age of career earnings converted to real values through a price index and an additional
1 percent for each year of payroll tax. The rate of return of pensionable earnings at
age r was slightly changed by the reform and it is a decreasing function of pensionable
earnings1.
Bt(r) = γRmin(cyrsR, 40)
∑R−1
s=R−n Ys(1 + 0.001)
R−s
n
(2)
3 SSW and retirement choices
This section is devoted to a brief description of standard financial incentives em-
bedded in any Social Security system. The Social Security wealth (SSW, from now on)
for a worker of age a were he to retire at age r is defined as the expected present value
of future pension benefits
SSWr =
S∑
s=r+1
ρsBs(r) (3)
1It was 2 per cent if pensionable earnings did not exceed a reference level legislated annually, 1.50%
if they were between the reference level and 1.33 times the reference level, 1.25% if they were between
1.33 and 1.66 times the reference level, 1.25% if they exceeded 1.66 times the reference level. From
1993, the number of income brackets increased from four to five, and the rate of return for the highest
earnings bracket was lowered from 1% to 0.90%.
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S is the age of certain death, ρs = β
s−apis is a discount factor that depends on the
rate of time discount β and the survival probability pi at age s conditional on being alive
at age r, and Bs(r) is the pension benefit expected at age s + 1 in case of retirement
at age r. Pension benefits are gross of taxes. The concept of SSW allows to define two
different incentive measures: the one-year Social Security accrual and the peak value
(Gruber and Wise, 1999; Coile and Gruber, 2000a). The first one is the difference in
SSW from postponing retirement from age a to age a+ 1
SSAa = SSWa+1 − SSWa (4)
SSAa =
S∑
s=a+2
ρs[Bs(a+ 1)−Bs(a)]− ρa+1Ba+1(a) (5)
The first term of the right-hand side is the expected present value of the increment
in the flow of pension benefits, while the second one is the present value of the pension
benefits foregone. Thus, the Social Security accrual is negative if the present value of
the expected increase in annual pension benefits is lower than the present value of the
benefits foregone. The second measure is the peak value:
PVa = maxrSSWr − SSWa, r = a+ 1, ...., R(6)
whereR is the mandatory retirement age. The peak value is the maximum difference
in SSW between retiring at future ages and retiring at the current age. The utility
analog of the peak value is given by the option value
OVa = maxrVr − Va, r = a+ 1, ...., R(7)
where V a =
∑S
s=a+1 ρs[κBs(r)]
γ is the intertemporal expected utility of retiring at
age a, while
Vr =
r∑
s=a+1
ρs(Ws − Cs)γ +
R∑
s=r+1
ρs(κBS(r))
γ (8)
is the intertemporal utility of retiring at age r > a. Since earnings are gross of taxes
and of Social Security contributions, I subtract from them the amount of contributions
Cs paid at the relevant age in order to avoid that pension benefits come for free to
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the employees. The option value is the maximum utility difference between retiring at
future ages and retiring at age a. Following Stock and Wise (1990), I parametrize the
model by choosing γ = 1 and κ = 1.25. Under these assumptions, Va = 1.25SSWa and
Vr =
∑r
s=a+1 ρs(Ws − Cs) + 1.25SSWr.
4 Data
The original sample contains more than 3.6 millions observations corresponding
about to more than 360,000 individuals over a long time period (1973-2003) selected
according to the date of birth and representative of 1/90 of the private sector employees
population. This data has some important advantages: it spans a long time period
and contains information on gross earnings which are the basis for the computation
of Social Security benefits (they are used by I.N.P.S. to compute pension benefits).
However, there are few drawbacks, and some of them have been overcome with the
new release (CLAP - Longitudinal Sample of Active and Pensioners) provided by the
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies:
• the data set only covers private-sector employees, excluding public-sector em-
ployees and self-employed. Even within the private sector the coverage is not full
and a small fraction of them is not included;
• the reason for a worker dropping off the archive is not always known, but the
range of possibilities is reduced since there is information about unemployment
benefits, mobility lists, etc.;
• important covariates are missing, there are very few demographic controls, I do
not know marital status and cannot say much about differential mortality;
• information about the amount of pension benefits lack;
• unlike previous data, there is precise information about year of retirement.
I draw a sub sample (corresponding to the 50% of the initial one) for computational
issues. The first selection is carried out focusing on workers between 16 and 70 years
of age, and dropping observations for which age is missing and individuals who work
less than 26 days a year. I exclude from the sample workers belonging to special
I.N.P.S. funds (airline pilots and journalists, nursery school teachers, etc.). In order to
estimate earnings profiles and calculate Social Security wealth and incentive measures,
I perform a further selection of the sample by including only workers who are present
in the sample for an uninterrupted period of at least five years. I only keep workers
who do not have substantial gaps in their records (more than 10 years missing) because
I do not know whether in that time span they were engaged in other labour market or
non-labour market activities.
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5 Age-earnings profiles
As mentioned in the previous section, any worker can enter and exit the archive
at any time, therefore I have an unbalanced panel. Computing individual age-earnings
profiles is the first step necessary to obtain SSW and the incentive variables. Modelling
lifetime profiles of earnings is crucial in the estimation of SSW at the individual level.
The information available to model age-earnings profiles in the sample consists only of
age, gender, occupation and region of working activity (the region where the firm is
located). I use a fixed effects model in order to get different age-earnings profiles for
each employee in the sample. I regress the logarithm of annual and monthly wage on a
third-degree polynomial of age and on working experience. Working experience is com-
puted as the difference between potential labour market experience and missing years,
i.e. the years when an employee leaves the archive plus years of unemployment since
they are not valid to accrue seniority on the job and thus they cannot contribute to
increase individual wages. Potential experience is given by the difference between age
and the average age of entry into the labour market imputed combining information
about the initial occupational level - used as a proxy of employees schooling attainment
- with cohort- and sex-specific data from the Bank of Italy survey. A similar compu-
tation is carried out for contributive years. Departing from the analysis conducted by
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2003), I do not include years of contribution as a covariate in
the fixed effects model since those years count in unemployment periods - in line with
the Italian legislation - but cannot be a valid predictor of the evolution of individual
wage through age. The model is fitted separately to men and women using the subset
of stable workers. Table 1 shows the estimated coefficients, sample sizes, the average
number of observations per worker and a measure of goodness of fit. The results are
for two different earnings measures: annual and full-year earnings. The last measure
is intended to account for the fact that people typically work only part of the year in
their first and last year in the sample. Figures 3 and 4 show the age-earnings profiles
of a reference worker, who started working when he was 17 years old, and whose fixed
effect is equal to the average. Figures 5 and 6 show the evolution across cohorts of
the mean value of the estimated fixed effects. Computing SSW requires assuming a
forecasting model for future earnings. For individuals at risk (aged 50-70), following
the approach by Brugiavini and Peracchi (2003), I assume that age-earnings profiles
are completely flat after the last year of observed earnings. The jump-off point for
the earnings projections is the average of the last three years of observed earnings in
order to smooth out the impact of extraordinary recession or expansion episodes. This
might seem to underestimate future earnings growth, especially for younger cohorts,
but since the sample at risk consists mainly of older cohorts, the problem is not severe.
6 Empirical specification
I model the conditional probability of exit from employment (conditional on being
employed in period t−1) and regress it on Social Security wealth, as defined in section
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3, expected earnings, age and other controls. I add dummies for the level of education2
and geographical area. If SSW is aimed at capturing an income effect, the incentive
variables are consistent with the presence of a substitution effect in retirement decisions.
Thus, a positive coefficient on Social Security wealth points to an income effect, whereby
individuals who accumulate money in earlier years retire earlier since a higher Social
Security wealth will induce individuals to consume more of all goods, including leisure.
Since the 1992 reform did not affect the structure of the incentives which represent
the economic advantage deriving from postponing retirement by one or more years, I
do not include any incentive in the empirical specification. After the reform there is
still a defined-benefit, non-actuarially fair system: what has been actually changed by
the reform is the absolute level of SSW and not its variation between couples of years.
The other relevant factor for retirement decisions are expected earnings. Individuals
who expect low future earnings have worse future opportunities by continuing working
than individuals with high expected earnings, thus they should be induced to retire
earlier. Furthermore, I include the interaction of age and a dummy for white collar
workers to allow for different preferences in retirement decisions: I assume that older
employees are more likely to retire because leisure becomes more and more expensive
and they prefer to spend their time in other activities; and preferences might differ
between white and blue collars. Denoting the observable characteristics as Xit and
Social Security wealth as SSWit, the conditional probability model is expressed as
Pr(Dit = 1) = G(α
′Xit + β′SSWit + xt + fc) (9)
where the term xt represents a time effect and fc are group effects, and G is the cu-
mulative distribution function of unobservables in the conditional exit model, assumed
to be Normal, and α and β are unknown response parameters.
7 Econometric issues
I estimate equation (??) on individual panel data: the estimation procedure raises
some econometric issues. First, Social Security wealth, i.e. the present discounted value
of future pension benefits, is not observed and needs to be imputed. The resulting vari-
able is therefore affected by measurement error, which is likely to introduce a bias in
the estimated coefficients. Standard assumption in these cases is that measurement
error is uncorrelated with the unobserved explanatory variable, and thus estimated
coefficients are biased toward zero. In a non-linear model, the direction of the bias is
not clear, and in some cases it might be away from zero (Pudney, 2001; Stefanski and
Carroll, 1985). A second source of bias is introduced by the possibility that individual
and unobserved heterogeneity in retirement behaviour is related to individual variables
used to estimate SSW, that means SSW is an endogenous regressor. In order to take
2I do not have direct information on educational attainments, thus I impute the level of education
by matching sex- and cohort-specific data from the survey by the Bank of Italy.
8
these problems into account, I use an Instrumental Variable technique, taking as in-
struments the group dummy interacted with the time dummy, where the first is defined
so to capture systematic differences in SSW between blue- and white-collar workers,
and especially in its time evolution. The change in law, represented by the interaction
of time and group dummies, is a good candidate since it is correlated, by construction,
to the endogenous variable SSW but not with the error process. The method implies
the use of a sudden unexpected change in Social Security rules. Identification requires
that SSW varies in a way that is not fully explained by group and time dummies. I test
this hypothesis by checking the significance of interaction terms in a regression of SSW
on group, time dummies, and their interaction. The reform allows the implementation
of such a technique as it induced changes in SSW that were different across the groups I
have defined. So the application of the natural experiment makes crucial the variation
across groups for the identification of the coefficient attached to SSW, and I define two
groups in order to maximize such variation in the sample. SSW is estimated separately
for men and women assuming a real discount factor of 3 per cent. Pension benefits
are defined in real terms and the indexation rules prevailing under each legislation are
implemented. To avoid the complications due to changes over time in the income tax
schedule, I only present calculations before income taxes.
8 Estimates of SSW and effect of the Amato reform
After the first selections (see section 4), I keep the time period between 1987 and
1995 needed to estimate the effect of SSW in order to have a number of years before
the reform sufficient to control individuals retirement behaviour, and some years after
the reform but before other reforms were legislated.
I take the same implicit assumption made by Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003):
the recession episode of 1993, with a fall in consumer expenditure and in household
disposable income, should not have differently affected the groups I consider, at least
for the variables influencing retirement decisions. I divide the working sample into
groups chosen to maximize the variation in Social Security wealth determined by the
Amato reform. I am careful in retaining only those employees who do not change their
occupation over time. The final sample is made up of 916 workers (6,837 observations):
682 blue collars and 234 white collars, 765 males and 151 females. Mean and standard
deviation for the relevant variables characterizing the final sample are shown in table 3.
The mean for dummy variables represents the proportion of that group: for example,
17% of employees are females and 75% are blue collars. The mean value of Social
Security wealth is about 207,393 euro, the mean expected earnings are equal to 24,168
euro. Looking at the pattern of the exit rates by year for individuals at risk of retirement
(aged 50-65) around the reform years, I observe constantly increasing exit rates for both
males and females from 1987 to 1991 when women have a peak in their hazard rate
while males show a stable hazard. There is a drop in retirement rates between 1992
and 1993, and from 1993 the exits start increasing again. That is clear evidence that
workers anticipated the reform and left the labour market as soon as they satisfied
the requirements to get a pension benefit in order to avoid the changes implied by
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the reform. To account for this pattern of exit rates and to magnify the impact of
the reform, I compute Social Security wealth according to the new rules as were they
legislated in 1991 and without the transitional phase. That is, I observe retirement rates
and a certain behaviour of employees, and I try to capture it in the econometric model.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of median Social Security wealth by occupation over 7
years (1989-1995). Blue collars observe a decrease in SSW from 1989 to 1993 (left side
of the graph), whereas it is striking the drop in median SSW for white collars between
1991 and 1992 (right side of the graph). In table 4, I have percentage changes in mean
values for SSW between three couples of years: the year before and after the reform
(1991-1992), between two years before 1991 (1989-1990) and two years after 1991 (1993-
1994). The table clearly shows the relevant decline in Social Security wealth between
1991 and 1992, and the differential impact on different groups of workers. Blue collars
experiment a reduction in mean SSW of 9%, and this drop starts in 1989. On the other
side, white collars have a very consistent decrease in their mean SSW of 23% due to
the reform. Thus, the variability due to the reform comes both from the definition of
groups (blue-collars versus white-collars) and time (pre-reform and post-reform years)
effects.
9 Effect of SSW on retirement decisions
I use a regression for each employee in the sample relating the conditional proba-
bility of exit from employment to expected earnings, an interaction of age and a dummy
for white collars, dummies for the level of education and geographical area, time and
group dummies. I experiment two different specifications: one includes dummy vari-
ables for education level and geographical area. The dummy variable for education
should capture different retirement behaviours due to a different labour market attach-
ment of people with different level of schooling (no-education or elementary education
versus high school education). The dummy for geographical area is meant to measure
the effect of working in the North compared to working in the South of Italy on retire-
ment choices: people working in the Southern part of the country might have a lower
probability to retire since they have more discontinuous careers. The interaction of a
linear term in age and a dummy for white collar workers is introduced to account for
the relevance of age - different according to workers occupation - in retirement decisions
in terms of preferences. Finally, the time dummy is aimed at capturing the effect of the
reform over all workers who did not retire before 1993 (via the change in requirements),
while the group dummy should retain the effect of the reform on employees with dif-
ferent occupation. I expect a negative sign attached to both the dummy variables, as
after the reform was passed, there has been a change in requirement to claim a pension
benefit and at the same time white-collars have been affected more than blue-collars
by the change in the law. Table 5 shows the results for two different specifications: the
dependent variable is retirement status, Social Security wealth is computed according
to the formula explained in section 3 and assuming γ = 1 (risk aversion parameter)
and β = 0.97 (time discount factor). Columns 3 and 4 of table 5 show the coefficients
of interest estimated by Instrumental Variables where the instrument is the interac-
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tion between time and group dummies. In order to check the rank condition on this
estimator, I regress the estimates of SSW on all the variables of interest and on the
interaction between time and group dummies, and test for the significance of the last
term. The null hypothesis is rejected [F (1, 1755) = 95, 66;F (1, 1757) = 87, 94] for ei-
ther specifications. The third column of table 5 shows the marginal effects of a probit
model estimated by maximum likelihood. Social Security wealth has the positive ex-
pected effect on the probability of retirement, that is employees with larger SSW have
a higher probability of retiring from the labour market. The dummy for geographi-
cal area has different signs in the two models, and it is not statistically significant,
whereas individuals with high expected earnings are less likely to exit the labour mar-
ket. The interaction term has a positive impact on the retirement probability as I
explained above, and being less educated increases the probability of retirement since
those employees are likely to have a lower attachment to the labour market. I cannot
identify the effect of being a white-collar relative to being a blue-collar after the re-
form relative to before, since I use the interaction of time and group dummies as an
instrument for SSW. The two dummy variables, one for years after 1991 and one for
being a white-collar worker, have the expected signs: being in the labour market after
the implementation of the reform reduces the exit probability since the rules become
tighter (in the first specification), and being a white-collar implies an analogous effect
because the reform extended the earnings reference period to calculate pension bene-
fits. The marginal effect of SSW on the probability of retirement is 0.00844 under the
specification excluding controls for education and geographical area, and it decreases
to 0.00762 with the full specification. It means that a drop of 10, 000 euro in SSW
decreases the probability of retirement by around 0.08%. Standard errors in the first
two columns of table 5 are bootstrapped standard errors allowing for dependence over
time in the unobservables for the same individual who survives in the panel more than
one period before retiring. Standard errors in the last two columns are robust standard
errors allowing for cluster effects based on different employees3. I calculate the exit
probability predicted by the two specifications for different levels of SSW to carry out
a policy experiment: I take the average individual, so that he has mean values of all
continuous variables and the reference category of dummy variables. I suppose that
Social Security wealth decreases by 15% (a drop of almost 31, 109 euro, roughly equal
to the decrease observed in the sample after the reform) and I feed this change through
the estimates for the average individual. I get a predicted exit probability dropping
from 6.4% to 3.9% with model 1-IV in table 5, and from 6% to 3.7% with model 2-IV.
Thus, the reform had a substantial effect on the retirement probability, and that points
to a significant effect of Social Security wealth on the supply side of the labour market.
What really matters is the increase in the marginal effect of Social Security wealth on
3As documented by Moulton (1990), Donald and Lang (2001) and by Bertrand, Duflo and Mul-
lainathan (2004), standard errors might dramatically understate the standard deviation of the estima-
tor when I regress outcomes at the individual level (probability of retirement) on a policy that applies
to all individuals in the group (the 1992 reform). I take account of this fact by correcting standard
errors in two ways: in the simple probit regression I correct standard errors by using block boostrap
method, and in the IV probit regression by using a robust covariance estimator according to a formula
developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) and implemented in STATA with the cluster command.
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the probability of retirement in the IV probit compared to the probit regression: that
is, the marginal effect increases for both the specifications, without and with control
variables, from 0.00084 to 0.0084 and from 0.00082 to 0.00762, respectively. That is
due to the two sources of bias, measurement error and endogeneity, which go in the
same direction.
10 Simulations of retirement choices under differ-
ent pension reforms
There are different ways to simulate reforms of the Social Security system, and one
of these is to exploit probit models estimates to investigate how retirement rates, the
implied employment rates and the related incentive measures would have been under
different policy regimes.
I carry out simulations separately for men and women using a simulation sam-
ple. The age-earnings profiles are those of representative individuals with earnings
equal to actual earnings registered in the archive for the relevant cohorts (individuals
born in 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1955) plus the difference, at the actual age of entry into
the labour market, between actual wages and their median values computed by year of
birth, sex, age and level of education. I use this method to build earnings in order to
have some variability in the data since such employees (belonging to the above men-
tioned cohorts and whose age of entry into the labour market was respectively 23, 22,
22 and 25 - in order to match the crucial levels of age and seniority used in the last
legislated reform) do not exist in the sample. The earnings are projected forward and
backward to cover the necessary time span, regardless of actual retirement or actual
entry into the sample. I add two cohorts of workers (1935 for males and 1940 for
females) in order to have variability in requirements to claim a pension benefit, since
employees born in 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1955, with a certain imposed number of years
of contributions, can get a seniority pension benefit through the accrued contributive
years requirement that was only marginally changed by the 1995 reform (which I do not
take into account). The maintained assumption, throughout all the simulated reforms,
is that policy changes are not anticipated. I perform four types of simulations carried
out for same number of pension reforms:
• Pre-1992;
• Pre-1992;
• Age-Shift Reform;
• Actuarial Adjustment Reform;
• Maroni Reform.
The first regime features the pension system before the 90s reforms, and it is
the reference case for the other reforms. The Age-Shift reform differs from the reference
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case and from the last reform because it is a policy exercise: it simply shifts forward
the two requirements of age and years of contribution by three years. The Actuarial
Adjustment reform features an early retirement age of 60 and a normal retirement
age of 65, where pensionable earnings are equal to the average of the last five years
of contribution, and benefits replace 60% of pensionable earnings when an employee
retires at age 65 with 40 contributive years. It consists of an actuarial reduction of 6%
per year for early claiming and an actuarial increase of 6per year for later claiming.
Simulations of the last two pension reforms is particularly relevant from a political
economy perspective. To better understand the point, it may be useful to think of the
Age-Shift reform as a policy change workers would strongly oppose since it explicitly
moves forward the requirements of age and contributive years to get a pension benefit.
This is very true in countries where the median voter gets old at a fast rate. On
the other hand, the Actuarial Adjustment reform does not change requirements, but it
makes retirement more expensive at early ages in terms of foregone pension benefit and,
on the other side, it gives a premium by introducing an actuarially fair pension formula
to workers who postpone retirement. All this really matters when policy-makers have
to choose the reform to implement and have to choose which one could guarantee the
best output in terms of budget savings at the minimum cost in terms of votes.
The Maroni reform is the most important in policy terms because it is the
last reform passed by the Italian Parliament and it took effect from January 2008 (see
Santoro (2004) to know the effectiveness of anticipated reforms). Its most evident
change is the increase of the age requirement to claim a seniority pension benefit: it is
57 under the Dini-Prodi regime and it will be 60 year of age until 2009, 61 from 2010
until 2013 and 62 from 2014 on.
For each individual in the simulation sample, I compute the value of SSW and
the implied incentive measures under the different regimes, while individual earnings
profiles are assumed constant across regimes and built according to the model described
in section 5.
I show the distribution of SSW and related incentive measures in figures 7 and 8
by comparing across regimes, and separately for men and women, the corresponding
age-profiles. The pre-1992 regime shows a hump-shaped profile of SSW, while under
the other regimes the age profile of SSW is strongly shifted downward especially over
the 50-60 age range and it is characterized by an almost continuous increase at least
under the Actuarial Adjustment regime. The Actuarial Adjustment and the Age Shift
reforms imply the largest reduction until age 60, whereas the Maroni regime lies in
between the pre-1992 and the 3-Years Age Shift regime. The related age profile of
SSW shows an increasing path until age 57 where there is a peak followed by another
increase until around age 61 when SSW starts a slow decline.
The age profiles of the incentive measures vary substantially across regimes. In
the case of men, the pre-1992 regime is characterized by age profiles becoming negative
as soon as a worker gets 35 years of contribution, and in many cases this happens by
age 55. This is clear evidence of an early retirement incentive induced by the pre-92
pension system. That system has been changed by the Amato and the subsequent
Dini-Prodi reform. The Age Shift policy design illustrates a 5-years shift of the age
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the incentive measures become negative at: this is due to the requirements introduced
by the Dini-Prodi reform and to the 3-years shift of this policy experiment. The last
legislated reform features a further shift with respect to the 1997 reform since the 1-
year accrual and the peak value become negative at about age 61, while at that age the
option value turns to zero. Finally, the Actuarial Adjustment reform is the only one
featuring positive incentive measures until age 70. For females, the evolution through
ages of SSW and incentive measures is shown in figure 10 and is analogous to that of
males with the relevant differences in terms of ages the incentives become negative at.
I fit a probit model to a sample of employees aged at least 50 in 1987 in order to
reduce composition effects as younger cohorts of workers get higher wages at each age
and by this way impact on the effect of SSW on the probability of retirement. Then,
I use individual values of SSW and incentive measures to get predicted age-profiles of
exit rates into retirement and the implied employment rates under each regime. This
is to sketch the effect of different reforms on the labour market, and more precisely
on the supply side (that is on workers choices). I carry out the simulations using a
specification in which retirement probability is a function of SSW, expected earnings,
pensionable earnings, the 1-year accrual, a linear term in age and age dummies at
observed spikes that are added as predictors to standard covariates. For men and
women separately, figure 11 represents predicted median age profiles of retirement
rates and implied employment rates conditional on employment at age 50 under each
regime. For males, exit rates are very similar until age 55 when the pre-1992 regime
implies the highest exit rates. The other regimes are characterized by very similar exit
and employment pattern: the 3-years Age Shift reform implies exit rates slightly above
those implied by the Actuarial Adjustment and Maroni reforms which in turn imply a
higher employment rate. For females, the pre-1992 regime implies the highest exit rate
and the lowest employment rate. Under the Actuarial Adjustment reform and the 3-
years Age Shift regime there are very close retirement rates, while the Maroni reform
shows the lowest exit rates and consequently the highest employment rates.
It is worth noting that the median retirement age, i.e. the age at which more than
half of the workers employed at age 50 is retired, is 60 under the pre-1992, 64 under the
Maroni regime for males and around 63 under the two policy experiments. For females,
the median retirement age is lower under the pre-1992 regime (50% of the workers
employed at age 50 is retired by age 58) than under all the other regimes (between age
64 and age 67). The surprising evidence consists of the higher employment rate for
women with respect to men at later ages. I attribute this fact to the higher proportion
of white collar and managers amongst women in my sample (47% of females against
29% of males).
11 Concluding remarks
A critical parameter for the design of Social Security policies is the responsiveness
of individuals labour supply to pension benefits generosity. Estimating this parameter
is notoriously hard in a simple reduced-form specification. Thus, I exploit exogenous
variation in Social Security wealth induced by the 1992. The event is particularly
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interesting since it did not change the unfunded nature of the defined-benefits pension
system, but it did change the present discounted value of future pension benefits for
many Italian private sector workers. The most important fact is that the change in
public pension wealth was not uniform across workers, and the differential impact allows
me to identify the effect of Social Security wealth on retirement behaviour. The
first step of the analysis consists of estimating the level of SSW for each worker in
the sample. Secondly, since my measure of Social Security wealth might be subject to
measurement error and might be related to individual and unobserved heterogeneity
in retirement behaviour, I implement an instrumental variable technique where the
instrument is the interaction of group and time dummies. The estimated coefficient
points to a positive income effect: workers with higher public pension wealth are more
likely to retire: a 10, 000 euro increase in SSW rises the probability of retirement by
around 0.08%. The marginal effect of SSW on the probability of retirement is higher
than in previous studies (see - for example - Brugiavini and Peracchi (2003)). That
means endogenity and measurement error heavily bias estimated coefficients and need
to be taken into account in order to get the causal effect. The second part of the
paper is devoted to simulations of retirement choices under different pension reforms.
The most important result is the change of retirement patterns across reforms: I observe
a decrease of retirement rates and a corresponding increase of employment rates, for
both males and females, when the system moves from the pre-1992 regime to the reform
legislated by the Italian Parliament in 2004. That implies the Italian Social Security
system is moving in the right direction.
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Figure 1: Fertility rate and life expectancy at birth
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Figure 2: Features of the Social Security System before and after the 1992 reform
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Figure 3: Estimated coefficients of the fixed effects model for log-earnings
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Figure 4: Descriptive statistics
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Figure 5: Mean value and percentage change in SSW by occupation
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Figure 6: Estimates of the effect of SSW on retirement probability: basic (M1) and
full specification (M2) (Probit and IV-Probit)
 
23
Figure 7: Age-earnings profiles - males
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Figure 8: Age-earnings profiles - females
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Figure 9: Average fixed effect - males
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Figure 10: Average fixed effect - females
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Figure 11: Median SSW by occupation
 
28
Figure 12: Age-profiles of median values of accrual, peak and option value, SSW by
regime - Males
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Figure 13: Age-profiles of median values of accrual, peak and option value, SSW by
regime - Females
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Figure 14: Predicted median age-profiles of exit rates into retirement and employment
rates conditional on being employed at age 50
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